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The July, 1989 Supreme Court ruling in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,' concerning a Missouri statute regulating abortions, once
again brought that high-voltage issue to the media forefront. Not the
least controversial aspect of the statute was the preamble, which claims
that human life begins at conception. Ostensibly, this leads to the conclu-
sion that such beings would be considered legal persons with at the least
the most basic rights.'
This part of the debate-the "personhood" of the fetus-is often ig-
nored, or at least obfuscated. Consider these exchanges from the PBS fo-
rum "Abortion: National Town Meeting," broadcast the evening of the
march for abortion rights in Washington on April 9, 1989; they are typical
of exchanges heard thousands of times since the early 1970's.
Rev. William Schultz (President, Unitarian Church): The key issue here
is a religious question. The key issue here is at what point does fetal life
turn into full human life entitled to the rights of protection of the Constitu-
tion. The legislature of Missouri has said at the point of conception. The
legislature of Missouri has taken a religions position.... There are many
religious positions.
Susan Smith (National Right to Life Committee): It is a human rights
issue, and the question is not whether a woman has the right or the decision
to bear a child. When she's pregnant, she's with child, and the question
before us is whether or not she has a right to kill that child.
Audience member: If it's not a baby at the moment of conception, what
* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota.
109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
The authors phrased the preamble such that it would remain consistent with Supreme
Court rulings, while asserting that life begins at conception.
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is it?
Schultz: It's a fetus.
[Moderator Fred Graham turns this apparently medical question over to
Dr. Louise Tyrer of Planned Parenthood.]
Tyrer: The opinion of the entire medical community of the world is
that conception is not synonymous with either the onset of pregnancy or the
beginning of life .... Human life, when that starts, is an individual moral
decision, and it's all over the maps. Some people believe that it starts at the
moment of fertilization; they're entitled to that belief. Some people believe
that human life or personhood-and the law supports in the English
law-that personhood occurs at the time of birth.
Graham: So you're saying that some biological functions may have
started; human life, in your judgment, you can't say.
Tyrer: That's correct.
Smith: Some doctors think that babies aren't babies until they're three
days old. Should they have the right to snuff out the life of that baby?
Kate Michelman (National Abortion Rights Action League): Of course
not. What a stupid question.
Another audience member: I would like to ask Miss Michelman, or any
of her colleagues, if they see any substantive difference between abortion
and infanticide, and if so, what would that be?
Schultz: We continue to get back to a question of faith. You equate
abortions with infanticide. It's clear that infanticide means what it says: the
killing of infants. Now infants are clearly born children. There is no com-
parison between abortion and infanticide. These are two different issues.
And the issue of when a fetal life becomes full human life entitled to the
full rights and protection of the Constitution is a religious question and a
question of faith. And just as we do not impose the views of one Church, on
birth control, for example, on all the rest of us, just as we don't insist that
we should pray one prayer in our public schools that one religious tradition
likes, so we don't try to impose this one religious perspective on the rest of
US.
These excerpts from a television forum are just one more chapter in
this ongoing debate. Many people-intelligent, professional, earnest peo-
ple-have been puzzling over the question of whether we should grant the
legal status of "personhood" to the unborn. Unfortunately, no one has
decided who is supposed to answer the question. The scientific commu-
nity, the legal community, and the philosophical community have all been
asked to deal with the question, and all have wrestled with it. These com-
munities have added a great deal to our understanding of the status of
the unborn. Still, when the talking is done, each community looks to the
others for the final answer. The lawyers and the lawmakers suggest that
we need more scientific evidence, or that it is an unsettled and unsettle-
able philosophical issue. The scientists only deal with measurable facts,
claiming that theorizing on the metaphysical or legal status of "per-
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sonhood" is out of their purview. The philosophers and theologians note
that they cannot come to a consensus on the issue, and toss it over to the
lawyers and scientists to work out as pragmatically as possible. An essay
several years ago in Time followed things to their logical conclu-
sion-hence to the height of confusion-by making the surprising sugges-
tion that "the very idea of 'actual human life' or 'personhood' is a politi-
cal . . . notion."' Yet the Supreme Court did come to an answer about
these questions, somewhat cagily in Roe v. Wade,4 more explicitly in later
decisions. This essay will examine how this decision was arrived at by
that portion of the Court in favor of abortion rights, what kind of a deci-
sion it was, and how the question ought ultimately to be decided. Part I
will analyze the opinions of members once in the majority, now (perhaps)
in the minority, to see how they resolved the "personhood" issue. The
focus will be on opinions written by Harry A. Blackmun and John Paul
Stevens. Part II will show what I believe to be the best (perhaps the only)
legitimate way to talk about the issue of legal personhood.
PART I
There are two opinions by Justice Blackmun of particular interest
here: his opinion for the Court in Roe,5 and his dissent in Webster. Jus-
tice Stevens offered some memorable words in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,7 and in his Webster dissent.8
We will concentrate first on Justice Blackmun's writings.
A(1). Justice Blackmun: Roe v. Wade9
Of the four we will examine, this opinion is the most careful in at-
tempting to keep separate the questions of legal and philosophical no-
tions of personhood, a distinction discussed at length in Part II of this
commentary. In Part VIII of the decision, Blackmun, speaking for the
majority, claimed that previous decisions have already established the ex-
istence of a right to privacy, even though it is not specifically mentioned
in the Constitution. 0 The Court believed this right broad enough to cover
' Charles Krauthammer, In Search of the Silver Bullet, TiME, Nov. 4, 1985, at 98 (emphasis
added). Justice Scalia echoed this opinion in his concurrence to Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3064-
66; it is unclear whether he included the personhood questions in this evaluation.
- 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
& Id. at 113-67.
6 109 S. Ct. at 3067-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7 476 U.S. 747, 772-82 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
• Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3079-85 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
o 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10 Id. at 152. The precedents cited are: Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1971);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v.
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the abortion decision-certainly a very intimate and personal mat-
ter-because of the possible harm the woman could undergo if this choice
were denied.1 There must be important state interests to legitimize cur-
tailment of such a liberty.' 12
Blackmun next considered, in Part IX, two vital questions: the legal
personhood of the unborn, and the question of when life begins.'" In con-
sidering the former question, the Court decided that the word "person,"
as it appears in the Constitution and its amendments, was not intended
to refer to the unborn,'4 and that in other areas of the law which have
treated prenatal life, the law has never treated the unborn as "persons in
the whole sense."'"
As to Texas' claim of a compelling interest in protecting the unborn
because life begins at conception, Blackmun gave this now famous re-
sponse: "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.
When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy,
and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this
point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to spec-
ulate as to the answer."'"
At the same time, Blackmun recognized the importance of determin-
ing the legal status of the unborn and of the possibility of doing so
through "the well-known facts of fetal development," stating that "[i]f
this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of
course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed spe-
cifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.' '17
Now, let us examine closely what went on here. A state wished to
protect the unborn as "persons." Admittedly, there is no place in the
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
Justice Stewart's list is even more extensive. See id. at 167-69 (Stewart, J., concurring).
"x Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (enumerated concerns were detrimental impact upon mother's
mental and physical health; inability of family to care for child; problems attached to un-
wanted children; difficulties associated with unwed motherhood; and disruption of mother's
life and future plans).
11 Id. at 153-54.
13 Id. at 156-62.
14 Id. at 156-59.
* 15 Id. at 162. The view that the unborn were not considered persons under the fourteenth
amendment is contested by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent. See id. at 172-75 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). See also S. KRASON, ABORTION: POLITICS, MORALITY, AND THE CONsTITUTION
158-73 (1984) (analysis of status of unborn in the law).
l Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
17 Id. at 156-57.
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Constitution or in the case law to this point which has done so explicitly;
on the other hand, nothing in the Constitution's use of the term forbids
understanding the term in this way. 18 It has not to this point been explic-
itly understood in this way, but the state proposed good reasons for doing
so. The Court admitted that if the fetus was a person, it was protected
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.19 Next, the
Court said that the philosophical question of "human life" or "per-
sonhood"-apparently relevant to the issue at hand-was at present un-
decided, and probably undecidable.2 0 Since the unborn had not yet been
recognized as persons, but the woman had been recognized a person, the
Court came to the conclusion that the woman's asserted liberty rights
must always prevail.2' From this we discover that no state may ever say
that a fetus is a person, nor ever adopt a definition of personhood or life.
In this way, the states are effectively shut off from ever finding the
truth of the situation, or at least of acting on that truth. No beings are
ever again allowed to be called persons, if doing so might curtail an al-
ready existing liberty.
If I might be permitted to draw a rough analogy, let us suppose we
stumbled onto a uncharted island where there are two races of people,
one which practices cannibalism, the other its victims. We confront the
cannibals, asking, "How can you in good conscience eat them?" "It's
o.k.," the cannibals respond, "because they are not persons." We point
out that they are indeed persons, that these victims have the same char-
acteristics for being considered persons as we and the cannibals do. We
take the matter up before the High Cannibal Judge, who pronounces: I
cannot decide whether these are persons as we are, but we have never
said so before in our laws. Of course, if we recognized them as persons, we
could not eat them; but then we would have to pick fruit and hunt game.
So we will not recognize them as persons.
What is going on in both cases-in Roe and in our analogy-is that a
matter of law has been decided on the basis of the result desired (do not
abridge the liberty of the woman or her doctor) rather than on the possi-
ble facts of personhood. Blackmun did not squarely face the question of
why certain entities are considered persons under the law, and whether
the unborn might match the criteria. It is also ironic that the Court was
able to find a "right to privacy" where it publicly acknowledged none was
stated,2" but found it impossible to discover a right to life for the unborn,
which it publicly acknowledged might be found in the due process
Is Id.
19 Id.
1* Id. at 159.
,1 Id. at 159-62.
2 Id. at 152.
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clause,2 because it interfered with this right to privacy.2,4
One suspects that, although Blackmun said that no decision had
been made as to whether an embryo is a living human being, a decision
had in fact been made that the embryo was not a person. How could one
recognize that, if such a life exists, it should be protected under the law,
and yet fail to try to determine whether there is such a life to be pro-
tected-and further excoriate a state for having done so-unless a deci-
sion has been reached against the embryo? The first tipoff to the Court's
rationale came in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion to Roe, where he
called the unborn "potential future human life."'2 5 In other words, it may
be human life in the future, but it is not a human life yet.
A(2). Justice Blackmun: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services26
Blackmun used the same sort of circular reasoning in his dissent to
Webster.27 In the first footnote, he argued against the constitutionality of
the Missouri statute's preamble (section 1.205) because of its effects, i.e.,
the state's declaration that human life begins at conception unconstitu-
tionally "chills" women's exercise of their right to terminate a pregnancy,
and further unconstitutionally burdens the use of abortifacient contra-
ceptive devices.28 This, of course, begs the question. If the preamble is
correct in its findings, does such a constitutional right to an abortion or
abortifacient devices exist at all? We have already seen that Blackmun
thinks not.
The only way Blackmun could have avoided begging the question
here is to have come to the conclusion that the fetus is not a human life,
and thus not a legal person. If this were so, however, there would be no
need to argue from effects, because the preamble would be unconstitu-
tional on its face; the question of effects would be quite second-
ary-indeed, irrelevant-to the point at hand.
Still, Blackmun made it clear that it is precisely these effects which
are the problem, and that the states cannot rely on the "decisional law"
findings (rather than constitutional findings) of the Court in regard to
fetal life.29 We must ask: Is it not important to settle the status of the
fetus? Do not the purported constitutional rights to abortion and abor-
tifacients follow from that status?
To clarify the point, Blackmun seemed to admit that, were there to
23 Id. at 156-58.
24 Id. at 152-53.
" Id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring).
26 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
"' Id. at 3067-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28 Id. at 3068-69 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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be proper evidence showing the embryo as a human life from conception,
the Court would logically be forced to recognize such beings as persons
under the law. The Missouri preamble claimed, in effect, to have made
such findings. Blackmun, however, claimed that any laws based on such
findings, or on the Court's own findings, which expand fetal rights, are
invalid, not because the findings are invalid, but because the effect is "un-
constitutional." The constitutionality of the effect, however, is dependent
on those findings. Thus, Blackmun can at most say that the laws are inva-
lid because he finds the effects undesirable.
Blackmun did approach the personhood issue when discussing the
majority's attack on the trimester scheme, and Rehnquist's statement
that the state's interest in protecting fetal life may be uniform through-
out pregnancy." Blackmun noted-correctly, I think-that the plurality
did not argue to the alleged problem with the trimester scheme, nor to its
view of the state's interest in fetal life.31 But Blackmun-and Justice Ste-
vens, as we shall now investigate-did recognize the importance of such
arguments: Roe v. Wade stands or falls on them. Only Justice Scalia from
the plurality seemed to have seen clearly the implications of the issue.2
Justice Blackmun's response to the plurality view came in the form
of a quote from Justice Stevens' written opinion in Thornburgh.3 It is to
this opinion that we now turn.
B(1). Justice Stevens: Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists3 4
Some interesting claims were made by Stevens in his concurring
opinion in Thornburgh."8 There are six of particular interest to us here:
(1) It is "obvious" that the state's interest in protecting the embryo in-
so Id. at 3057.
81 Id. at 3072-76 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Is Id. at 3064-67 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Scalia recognized
that had the majority done its job in establishing legitimate arguments for these positions,
they would have been forced to act, and probably overturn Roe. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). "We have not disposed of this case on some statutory or proce-
dural ground, but have decided and could not avoid deciding, whether the Missouri statute
meets the requirements of the United States Constitution. The only choice available is
whether, in deciding that constitutional question, we should use Roe v. Wade, as the bench-
mark, or something else." Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3' Id. at 3073 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "It is this general
principle, the 'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a
whole.'..." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1986)
(Stevens, J. concurring) (quoting Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHEL. & PUB. AFF. 288, 288-89
(1977)).
- 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
5 Id. at 777-82 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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creases as the embryo's ability to survive, to experience pain and pleas-
ure, and to react, increases; 6 (2) the government's interest in protecting
cannot be "static," because pregnancy and fetal development are not
static; 87 (3) recognizing the fetus as a person is a "religious view[;]" '88 (4)
there is a "fundamental and well-recognized difference between a fetus
and a human being[;]" 8 9 (5) "if there is not such a difference, the permis-
sibility of terminating the life of a fetus could scarcely be left to the will
of the state legislatures[;]' '4 (6) since, however, we do treat fetuses differ-
ently from human beings under Roe, there is no reason why we cannot
make distinctions during the nine months prior to birth.41
Stevens used these arguments again in Webster, but a few comments
are called for now. To the first claim, that protection increases as the
ability to feel and react increases, one must ask whether, alternatively,
the protection decreases as these abilities decrease or, as in some (the
neurologically damaged or comatose, or the just plain unconscious), they
disappear? It would have to, if the ability to feel and react is the criterion
for protection, and if the government's interest is not to be "static." Ste-
vens' second claim, however, is also strange. No part of life is static; there
is always change and development. Yet, the government "statically" pro-
tects all living human beings after birth, despite the changes.42
Stevens believed the remaining claims definitively answered this ob-
jection. In the third claim, he said that calling the fetus a "human life" or
"person" is a "religious view, and yet in his fourth claim he said, not
that we do not know whether the fetus is a human being, but rather that
it definitely is not a human being.44 In other words, Stevens had taken an
equally "religious" stand (as had Blackmun, by quoting Stevens). One
must further ask: If the fetus is not a human being, what is it? And if the
difference is so "well-recognized," why is there such a battle, and why has
the pro-abortion side on the Court been trying to hide behind Justice
Blackmun's assertion that the issue is undecided?
Stevens' fifth claim is right on the money, and Blackmun said as
much in 1973. At least they recognized the issue at stake. The reasoning
underpinning his sixth claim, however, is purely circular. Roe said that we
Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).
s' Id. at 778-79 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
40 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
1 Id. at 778-79 (Stevens, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 792 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White said as much in his dissent, noting that
"there is no nonarbitrary line separating a fetus from a child, or indeed, an adult human
being." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
4" Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring).
44 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
LEGAL STATUS OF THE UNBORN
may -make distinctions between the unborn and the born. The issue at
stake here is whether Roe is correct in this assertion. Stevens appealed to
Roe for the solution-a perfect circle.
For a longer analysis of these and other arguments, let us now turn to
Stevens' Webster opinion. 3 This opinion is so riddled with errors that it
requires a careful look.
B(2). Justice Stevens: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services46
Justice Stevens concentrated most of his efforts in his dissenting
opinion on an attack of the constitutionality of the preamble to the Mis-
souri statute.4 7 Stevens recognized that if human life did begin at fertili-
zation, the preamble would rule out the use of many common forms of
contraception which work as abortifacients." He concluded: "To the ex-
tent that the Missouri statue interferes with contraceptive choices, I have
no doubt that it is unconstitutional under the Court's holdings in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Carey v. Population Ser-
vices International."49
Did these cases give a woman a right to an abortion or abortifacients,
we might ask? Insofar as they merely said that contraception is legal,
they did not rule out proscription of abortifacients. You can practice as
long as it does not harm another. This is true of any liberty. -
Stevens' response to this objection was that there might be a theolog-
ical argument to support this thesis-one that shows, perhaps, that en-
soulment takes place at fertilization-but that "a secular basis for valid
legislation" is required. 0 However, said Stevens, "I am not aware of any
secular basis for differentiating between contraceptive procedures ... "5
Thus, the preamble violated the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment, not because it coincides with religious tenets, nor because legisla-
tors may have been religiously motivated, but because it is "an unequivo-
cal endorsement of a religious tenet" that "serves no identifiable secular
purpose."52
To illustrate his point, Stevens launched into an explanation of the
teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas and Catholicism on ensoulment and
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3079-85 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
" Id. at 3079-82 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"Id. at 3080-81 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id. at 3081 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
Id. at 3082 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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abortion, and tried to make a comparison to the present circumstances."3
Stevens' misunderstanding of both Aquinas and Catholic teaching was so
profound as to be painful. He took his information from two sources: a
report entitled Catholic Teaching on Abortion prepared by the Congres-
sional Research Service of the Library of Congress, and the amicus curiae
brief by Americans United for the Separation of Church and State.54
Stevens referred to the fact that St. Thomas Aquinas believed that
the infusion of the rational soul into the embryo did not occur until some
forty to eighty days after fertilization, and that this view was "widely ac-
cepted by the leaders of the Roman Catholic Church for many years.""5
He then asserted that "abortion of the 'unformed' or 'inanimate' fetus
(from anima, soul) was something less than true homicide. . . .-5 This
was because "[w]hat is destroyed in abortion of the unformed fetus is
seed, not man."' '57 Consequently, the Church did not treat abortion before
animation as homicide. 58
Stevens took this situation to be similar to that facing the Supreme
Court: if a state legislature were to enact such views today-even if they
were widely held-the Court would invalidate "such an endorsement of a
particular religious tenet." The preamble to the Missouri statute is just
such a "theological doctrine.
'5
0
This conclusion demonstrated an understanding neither of Aquinas
nor of the relationship of his beliefs to Church teaching. For Aquinas
there was no such thing as an "inanimate" fetus. By definition, any living
thing is considered to have a soul, as the soul equates with the principle
of life. Aquinas considered that as living things developed, the soul ap-
propriate to its level of development was present. For humans, this meant
that a human being first had a soul on the level of a plant, then on the
level of an animal, and finally a rational soul. He believed this last event,
the infusion of the rational soul, took place between forty and eighty days
after fertilization, because at that point he knew the fetal body to be de-
veloped enough to support rational activities. Thus the embryo, while not
fully a person, is nonetheless human, and never merely "seed." 0
" Id. at 3083-84 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 3083 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Report on Catholic
Teaching on Abortion, in CONG. RESEARCH SERV.).
57 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting C. WHI1hER, CATHO-
LIC TEACHING ON ABORTION: IT'S ORIGIN AND LATER DEVELopmENT 18 (1981), reprinted in
Brief for Americans United for Separation of Church and State, at 13a, 17a, Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605).
"Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I, 76, 3 corpus and ad 3; 4. corpus and ad 1; 118, 2, ad 2; SUMMA
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Aquinas based this belief on the best scientific evidence available in
his day, which evidence had not changed since the time of Aristotle. In
fact, it is to Aristotle that we owe this theory, not Aquinas. 1 Aquinas
took his evidence almost word for word from Aristotle-and acknowl-
edged as much. The theory of the succession of souls is also Aristotle's, a
person who, having been born almost 400 years before the birth of Christ,
could hardly be said to be promoting Christian doctrine.
Aristotle's explanation could best be described as a scientific one:
given the evidence at hand, it could best be explained in this way. Simi-
larly, the Copernican theory of the planets, or the Darwinian theory of
natural selection, or Einstein's relativity theory have been scientific ex-
planations of known facts. Since the evidence had not changed between
360 B.C. and 1260 A.D., Aquinas accepted Aristotle's explanation as
sound. The Church's acceptance of this theory followed from the fact that
it was the best science of the day. It is not based on revelation, as theo-
logical doctrines are. As such, the theory of the late infusion of the ra-
tional soul is no more a religious tenet than the once widely held belief
that the earth was the center of the solar system. It is rather a scientific
explanation which happens to have a religious significance insofar as it
happens to support certain beliefs of Christianity-a relationship which
Stevens had explicitly accepted as legitimate in forming valid legislation.
We must grant, however, that despite the basically scientific charac-
ter of Aristotle's and Aquinas' claims, they can also properly be called
philosophical speculation, since they venture beyond the actual facts at
hand to an explanation of how these facts could be. Of course, this is the
nature of all scientific theorizing; we may have more facts at hand in the
twentieth century, but an overall explanation of these facts calls for phil-
osophical speculation. Let us grant, then, that theories about personhood
or full humanity of the fetus are philosophical, and thus (perhaps) not
properly incorporated into law. A secular basis for valid legislation is re-
quired. Examination of the facts at hand regarding the fertilized ovum/
embryo/fetus is possible, and will yield that secular basis, and a solution
to the question of the proper legal status of the unborn. We will take this
in Part II.
In the meantime, let us see how Justice Stevens dealt with the al-
leged "theological" problem. He said that to incorporate a theological
CoNTRA GENTIES II, 88 and 89; DR ANIMA II, ad 2; X ad 2; DE SPmrruALS CREATURMUS III,
ad 13; IV, ad 9 (relevant texts from St. Thomas Aquinas).
" See AmSTOTLE, DE ANIMA II, 1 and 4; DE GENERATIONE ANIMALUM II, 3. Justice Blackmun
acknowledged Aristotle's contribution to the development of this concept, but Justice Ste-
vens' source appears to have overlooked or ignored it. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-61
(1973).
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(philosophical) position into law, a valid secular interest must be met."
One might well argue that the state interest in seeing to it that all human
beings are protected from unjust death is served by the adoption of such
a philosophical position. A response to this might be to say that this puts
the cart before the horse: having decided to put a particular course of
action into effect, a theory is adopted by law to make that possible. Such
a rebuttal is clearly legitimate.
I believe this response to be correct. Despite the laudable interest in
protecting all possible human life, adopting a theory merely because it
supports the goal is improper, especially insofar as it reduces the bases of
fundamental rights to the desires of the lawmakers. What, however, did
Stevens do to support his claim of a woman's fundamental right to pro-
cure abortion before viability, unimpeded by any state regulation?
As a secular matter, there is an obvious difference between the state
interest in protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in pro-
tecting a 9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth.... [A]
State has no greater secular interest in protecting the potential life of an
embryo that is still "seed" than in protecting the potential life of a sperm or
an unfertilized ovum.68
Relating this to the contraceptive issue, Stevens said that "the Con-
stitution allows the use of contraceptive procedures to prevent potential
life from developing into full personhood." '64
What is going on here? Bluntly, Stevens did precisely that which he
purportedly argued against-he adopted a philosophical theory in order
to justify his position. In footnote twelve of his dissent in Webster, Ste-
vens noted that the justification for abortion rights is the lack of consen-
sus among experts about life's onset.66 Yet Stevens stated categorically,
here and in Thornburgh, not that we do not know when human life be-
gins, or when a fetus becomes a human being; rather, he said the embryo
most definitely is not a human life or person, but only "potential life,"
equivalent to "seed" (which, by definition, is "not man").66
Indeed, this is the only way the Court could possibly uphold such a
"liberty interest" as sweeping as abortion rights. If, as the Court seemed
to think, legal personhood follows only from philosophical personhood,
and if there were truly no holding on whether an embryo is (philosoph-
ically) a human life, the Court would be forced to hold the "liberty" of
abortion in abeyance, not knowing whether abortion would kill a person,
" Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3083-84 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63 Id. at 3084 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65 Id. at 3083 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Report on Catholic
Teaching on Abortion, in CONG. RESEARCH SERV.).
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and realizing that no liberty can be exercised which is at the expense of
another's life (except, perhaps, self-defense). Indeed, it would be impera-
tive for the attainment of such liberty that the embryo be found not a
"person." This is precisely what the Court did implicitly in Roe, and Ste-
vens stated explicitly here. Having decided to grant abortion rights, a the-
ory of life-that the embryo is not a human life or person, while "born"
people are-has been adopted to back up that right. The move by Justice
Stevens is as illegitimate as the move he accused the statute's authors of
making.
Stevens has a peculiar notion of why it is that human beings should
be granted a right not to be killed. We saw it in Thornburgh,67 and he
repeated it in Webster: "There can be no interest in protecting the newly
fertilized egg from physical pain or mental anguish, because the capacity
for such suffering does not yet exist; respecting a developed fetus, how-
ever, that interest is valid." 8
Two claims are entailed in this statement: (1) in order to be consid-
ered human life or a person (in the philosophical sense), one must be
capable of experiencing physical pain or mental anguish; and (2) these are
the only two things from which the state protects us.
Both of these claims are nonsense. To the first, one must ask Stevens
his opinion of the legal status of the comatose, perhaps the severely re-
tarded (who may lack mental anguish), or the cerebrally or spinally dam-
aged (who may feel no pain from certain actions). For that matter, a
sleeping or unconscious person would fit the description. Some poisonous
gas or a lethal injection Would cause neither pain nor anguish to these
people. Are they thus not persons or human beings because of this fact?
Of course they are; in fact, we protect such as these precisely because
these handicaps (temporary or permanent) make them especially
vulnerable.
The second claim is equally spurious. If someone is killed in such a
manner whereby he or she experienced neither pain nor anguish, can we
reasonably say that person has not been harmed? Why do we protect as
legal persons corporations and institutions which are (by definition, not
by accident) incapable of pain or anguish? It is because there are more
ways to suffer harm than to experience pain and anguish. The most fun-
damental harm for living beings is to lose that without which there can be
neither pain, nor anguish, nor liberty-to lose one's life. The state is
harmed as well when those under its protection (or, in the present case,
those who should be under its protection) suffer harm. To allow such
harming to go unchecked places everyone, and the state itself, at risk.
07 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3084 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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It seems fairly clear that, in order to have abortion count as a liberty
interest under the right to privacy located in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, it is necessary to make a decision about the per-
sonhood of the fetus. The decisions cited seem to indicate the belief that
the philosophical or theological notion of personhood is important to the
resolution of the legal question. Through a series of circular arguments
and outright contradictions, these opinions claim to have left the philo-
sophical/theological question unanswered while in fact answering it in the
negative, thus opening the field for nearly unrestricted abortion rights.
Justice White had some very telling remarks about the pro-abortion
rights rationale. In his dissent in Thornburgh, he said the following:
As the Court appropriately recognized in Roe v. Wade, "[tihe pregnant
woman cannot be isolated in her privacy," 410 U.S., at 159; the termination
of a pregnancy typically involves the destruction of another entity: the fe-
tus. However one answers the metaphysical or theological question whether
the fetus is a "human being" or the legal question whether it is a "person"
as that term is used in the Constitution, one must at least recognize, first,
that the fetus is an entity that bears in its cells all the genetic information
that characterizes a member of the species homo sapiens and distinguishes
an individual member of that species from all others, and second, that there
is no nonarbitrary line separating a fetus from a child or, indeed, an adult
human being. Given that the continued existence and development-that is
to say, the life-of such an entity are so directly at stake in the woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, that decision must be
recognized as sui generis, different in kind from the others that the Court
has protected under the rubric of personal or family privacy and autonomy.
Accordingly, the decisions cited by the Court both in Roe and its opinion
today as precedent for the fundamental nature of the liberty to choose abor-
tion do not, even if all are accepted as valid, dictate the Court's
classification.
If the woman's liberty to choose an abortion is fundamental, then it is
not because our precedents (aside from Roe itself) command or justify that
result; it can only be because protection for this unique choice is itself "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or, perhaps, "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition." It seems clear to me that it is neither."
PART II
What the introduction and Part I of this essay indicates, I think, is
the depth of the confusion concerning how to go about answering the
"personhood" question from a legal standpoint. No one seems to be able
to sort out which community-scientific, philosophical/theological, or le-
gal-should be relied on, nor how they should be related, nor even the
" Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 792-93 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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meaning of the terms involved.
There are two main difficulties to be addressed. There is confusion
concerning the expectations placed on each of the communities to come
up with the answer. Also, there is even greater confusion about the term
"human life" and the term "personhood," and their various meanings.
Since the former confusion relies so heavily on the latter, let us try to
clarify the latter first.
One of the maddening things about how this issue is argued is the
way the pro-abortion rights side abuses the normal usage of the terms
and smudges the boundaries between scientific, philosophical, and legal
senses of the word. More maddening still, however, is the normal re-
sponse of the anti-abortion side, a flat contradiction without explanation.
For the light that is generated, a typical exchange might just as well go as
follows:
"It's a philosophical/religious issue."
"No, it's a scientific fact."
"No, it's not."
"Yes, it is. .. "
and so on. We never get to the root of the matter: what are scientific
terms and questions, what are legal ones, and how did philosophy and
theology get into the argument at all?
There are two basic terms that get bandied about in this debate-by
both sides-as though they are interchangeable. The first is "person" (or
"personhood," depending on context). The second is "human life." (Dr.
Tyrer's speech above is a particularly remarkable example of such blithe
movement from scientific, to philosophical, to legal terms and usage.) We
must clearly distinguish these terms.
The term "person" can be used legally or philosophically. Legally, it
is a question of who can make a legitimate claim to be a recipient of
constitutional rights. Those who can make such a claim are called per-
sons. The philosophical concept of "personhood" is very different. It deals
with a different set of issues, such as whether personhood is something
that happens once and for all to the individual, or is grown into; how
great a degree of rationality is necessary to be considered a person; or
whether other beings (animals with higher intelligence, rational extrater-
restrials, God) could be considered persons.
The term "human life," on the other hand, is clearly not a legal one.
Neither, however, is it a philosophical term, even though it is often al-
leged to be one. The very words are simplicity itself. To ask someone, "Is
this a human life?" is to ask, "Is this being alive, and is it a member of
the species homo sapiens?" That is all the words mean. To start asking
whether human life might begin at viability, or birth, or (as some actually
hold) after birth, is to do something different: either it is a metaphorical
question (possible answer: "life begins at forty"), or it is using the wrong
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words to ask the philosophical question, "At what stage do we reach a
certain fullness of humanity (personhood)?" Ask Andrew Puzder, co-au-
thor of the Missouri statute, who pointed out on the April 23, 1989 edi-
tion of "This Week with David Brinkley," that with such a question, pro-
legalization writers "try and go a step beyond and ask quality-of-life-type
questions." This is very different from the empirically-based question,
"When does human life begin?" It is precisely the kind of muddling of
the issue necessarily perpetrated by those in favor of decriminalizing
abortion, and enriched by the Supreme Court in 1973. Justice White's
Thornburgh dissent tries to point to this fact.
The scientific question is about brute fact, empirically discernable.
The brute facts, the scientific data, can be supplied by the medical com-
munity. They can tell us the processes by which the sperm and ovum
unite and begin development from zygote to newborn. They can tell us
about the relationship of dependence between this entity and its environ-
ment (be it uterus or petri dish). This is all science can legitimately tell
us, and all we ask of the medical community in this regard.
The legal community must look into what sorts of entities have been
recognized by the status of "person," and on what grounds. The only
question that they need to answer in this regard, then, is: Does this devel-
oping entity meet the criteria for protection under the law? If so, this
entity is a legal person. This is the entirety of the legal role in the debate.
The philosophical community, by contrast, has no place in the debate
at all. While the philosophical search is interesting in its own right, and of
practical concern to people as moral agents, it only muddies the waters in
this argument. Why?
Let us consider the gist of the furor in Washington, and in legisla-
tures across the nation. The one side says, "Look, these little entities are
no different from you and me. They have just as much right to the pro-
tection of their lives from the use of deadly force as we do." The other
side retorts, "No, the situations are entirely different. If you can even
establish that this entity is a human life, that does not mean it has rights
as a person." What question is being asked here? The legal question be-
ing asked is: What are the reasonable criteria for providing basic legal
protection, and does this unborn entity match the criteria?
The basic criteria for providing legal protection that we have come to
recognize as legitimate are that the entity be (a) an individual, (b) living,
and (c) human. This formulation- should surprise no one. These are the
same criteria that made us see that slaves were not just pieces of furni-
ture. They are the criteria by which women ceased being viewed as simple
extensions of their fathers and husbands. They are the basis of our cries
of anguish at the slaughter of European Jews, repression in South Africa,
disappearance and death squads in South America. They are the basis of
the legislation protecting children from being considered the property of
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their parents. On these grounds, even foreigners are afforded protection
and due process.
These criteria are the only ones that can be used if a legal system is
going to claim to protect anyone. If we allow ourselves to get off on tan-
gents, to even discuss a "deeper metaphysical meaning" of personhood,
then no one is safe. Philosophy, by its very nature, cannot supply final
answers to any question. It can supply insights, yes, some of which be-
come part of how we live (the basic political and legal philosophy on
which our Constitution is based, for instance). Its contributions, however,
are inherently subject to revision and growth, or even a complete change
of outlook. As long as the legal concept of personhood is subject to change
due to philosophical perspective, no one's rights are certain. The question
becomes, as we say, political. Whatever group is in power can legislate
any other group out of its rights simply by definition-by declaring that
the group has failed to meet certain dubious criteria for personhood. It
can happen; it has happened. Ask blacks. Ask Jews. Ask women.
The criteria, then, are that an entity be an individual, living, human
being. What kinds of creatures fit this standard? We should be willing to
recognize that any being of human parentage, from the time of fertiliza-
tion, matches the criteria. Here is where the medical community can add
something to the debate. Let us look at some medical facts.
Is the conceptus "human"? Undoubtedly. As the result of fertiliza-
tion of a human ovum by a human sperm, with human genetic patterns, it
cannot be anything else. It will not develop into a rock, or a rosebush, or
a rabbit. It will develop into a full-grown human being. Ah, one might
ask, but is it then fully human, truly human? This question is irrelevant.
It is a philosophical red herring that has been allowed to slip into this
debate. When does anyone become fully human? Is a three-year-old fully
human? How about a retarded adult, or a comatose patient? Am I as
fully human as my grandfather? These are philosophical questions, not
legal ones, not medical ones, and as such they must be left out of the legal
debate.
Is the conceptus "living"? Certainly. Again, it is the result of two
living cells. It is its own center of self-maintenance. It draws nourishment
from its environment. It grows. What other criteria could there be? Per-
haps a human being needs to be capable of breathing on his or her own to
be alive. Of course, this would rule out as "living" many human beings on
life support systems. What about brain activity? This is a good indication
of when a human being has ceased living, has ceased being its own center
of activity and maintenance, but it is hardly a definitive test for life. Any
bacterium is considered alive, but it would hardly register brain activity.
Is the conceptus an "individual"? Clearly. It is a separate living en-
tity from the mother, an independent existent. By "independent" .I don't
mean that it is dependent on no person or. thing around it for support. A
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child is fully dependent on those around it to give it what it needs to
sustain itself, as is a fully paralyzed adult. Every human being, as well, is
radically dependent on a suitable environment to survive. None of us can
survive, without artificial means, in a methane atmosphere, or in the mid-
dle of the Atlantic Ocean. What I mean here is that the conceptus is fully
separable from its mother, has a separate identity from its mother. This
is most clearly illustrated in the case of so-called test-tube babies. Doc-
tors can identify the little bundle of cells in the petri dish, and then place
it in the mother's uterus, where it attaches itself to the uterine wall. It is
not part of the mother; though like any child, it is entirely dependent on
her to live.
Unless we begin to use terms such as "human," "living," and "indi-
vidual" in entirely new ways, it is clear that we are all individual living
human beings from conception. Thus, the scientific community has done
its job-it has identified the embryo/fetus as human life-and can bow
out of the debate. The philosophical/theological community, which be-
came illegitimately drawn into this human life/personhood debate, should
recognize its inability to add anything helpful-since metaphysical and
moral topics are not the issues-and withdraw gracefully as well.
This leaves only the legal community to do its job. If protection
under the law is to have any meaning-if any of us are to be guaranteed
our right-then protection must be granted on the sole basis of being an
individual, living, human being. As such, the unborn, from conception,
are persons in the legal sense, and it is time for legislators, litigants, law-
yers and judges to acknowledge the fact.
This is the thrust of the argument of Nellie Gray, a member of the
March for Life, in the following exchange with Kate Michelman.
Gray: You're losing [the] fact of what's happening. You're killing a
preborn child. Of course this is the state's business. This is homicide.
Michelman: In your view it's a preborn child...
Gray: It is culpable ignorance if you don't know that a preborn child is
in existence at fertilization.
Michelman: Nellie, you have a right to your position, but you don't
have a right to impose it on everyone else.
Gray: It's not a belief, it's a fact.
Now, we acknowledge that Ms. Michelman is correct insofar as we
ought not legally impose any philosophical definitions. It was the move-
ment for the legalization of abortion, however, that brought up the issue.
Ironically, it is this movement that is imposing a philosophical opinion.
By raising the specter of "imposition of religious doctrine," the pro-abor-
tion rights forces have gotten the Court to declare as the law of the land
the view that the unborn are not persons, and thus may be treated as
disposable property. The anti-abortion argument, on the other hand, has
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never rested on philosophical definitions or theological opinions. It rests
on an empirically verifiable state of affairs.
Thus, Nellie Gray is essentially correct. Because it is a fact, the gov-
ernment is no more "imposing a belief' on anyone than they are by ac-
knowledging that the earth is round. Some people disagree (e.g., the Flat
Earth Society), but the government is not thereby under obligation to
abandon air traffic regulations, or to refuse to support the space program.
It is not enough, to simply repeat that it is a fact, as though that
settles the argument. By doing so, pro-abortion rights forces are allowed
to continue to cloud the issue. It must be shown that this is not a philo-
sophical or religious "belief;" it must be shown how a claim to legal per-
sonhood is based, and must be based, solely on the stated medical facts; it
must finally be shown how the philosophical notion of personhood has no
place in the argument, and should never have influenced the Supreme
Court's decision in the first place. It is now up to that Court-or, if it
should fail, the legislators of the nation--to ignore the philosophical is-
sues, and return the claim to personhood to its rightful heirs: individual,
living, members of the species homo sapiens. Furthermore, it is up to all
of us to refuse to allow this continued confusion between the terms
"human life" and "personhood" and their various uses.
While the recognition of this simple fact may shed light on previously
darkened places, it does not solve all difficulties. In the abortion debate,
for example, there is still the question of balancing the rights of one indi-
vidual existing human being-the unborn child-against those of an-
other-the mother. The question now becomes another legal one: What
are the reasonable criteria for the use of deadly force by one individual
human being against another? Again, if legal protection is to mean any-
thing, these criteria must be as stringent in the case of abortion as in any
other life situation.
If there is one lesson that George Orwell's 1984 should have taught
us, it is that our greatest fear should not be death by nuclear incineration,
but rather extinction by definition. It is a lesson we ignore only at great
peril.

